06-21-2025, 10:47 PM
No—I’m not. This case is fundamentally built on an unconstitutional search and seizure.
The warrant used by law enforcement was a general warrant, in violation of the Fourth Amendment, because it failed to particularize what was to be searched for. Instead, it broadly authorized the seizure of my devices and “any and all files” within them—without limitation.
But the law is clear. The U.S. Supreme Court held in Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014), that “the wholesale seizure of every piece of data on a digital device is unconstitutional”. Similarly, in United States v. Galpin, 720 F.3d 436 (2d Cir. 2013), the court emphasized that digital searches must be narrowly constrained because of the immense volume of private data stored on modern devices. Other rulings like United States v. Ganias (2014), United States v. Winn (2015), and United States v. Morton (2021) reinforce this principle: law enforcement cannot seize or examine all digital content unless they have probable cause for each category of data.
So let’s be clear: this warrant wasn’t just procedurally flawed—it was structurally unconstitutional.
Furthermore, I requested a Franks hearing years ago, having made the required “substantial preliminary showing” that the affidavit used to obtain the warrant contained false statements or material omissions. It took nearly four years to even reach a scheduled hearing—and then, just days before it was set to occur, my attorney withdrew. That withdrawal wasn’t coincidental. It occurred under suspicious circumstances involving outside interference and communications from third parties, including someone who had a documented history of undermining my defense. This not only denied me the opportunity to challenge the warrant—it constituted a violation of my right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.
As for the bail order, it too was constitutionally flawed. Bail is supposed to be based on probable cause, and the court must weigh the totality of the circumstances (Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983)). Yet in my case, the State’s narrative was both incomplete and misleading. They told the court that I had been arrested in 2018 for allegedly making a threat, that my computers had been seized, and that the FBI had discovered an image on those devices. What they left out was critical:
That the original state charges were dismissed in April 2018 due to a lack of probable cause;
That the original warrant was quashed—and therefore the devices should have been returned;
That the image in question was found after the warrant had been quashed, meaning the search was unauthorized and constitutionally defective;
That the FBI waited nearly two years to obtain a second warrant, with no legal justification for that delay;
And that the federal government declined to prosecute, returning the matter to Illinois.
The courts have consistently held that delays in obtaining a warrant beyond 31 days are presumptively unreasonable, absent exigent circumstances (see United States v. Pratt, 915 F.3d 266 (4th Cir. 2019), among others). In this case, two years lapsed before new action was taken—a delay that undermines the validity of any subsequent search.
The bottom line is this: the State built its probable cause argument on a selectively crafted narrative that excluded exculpatory facts and procedural defects. That is not justice—it’s manipulation. And the bail conditions imposed as a result are tainted by that misrepresentation.
I respectfully assert that this entire case rests on constitutional violations that cannot be ignored or cured. The warrant was invalid. The search was unlawful. The Franks hearing was undermined. And the bail order rests on flawed and misleading information.
This is not how due process works.
And it’s not how justice is supposed to look.
The warrant used by law enforcement was a general warrant, in violation of the Fourth Amendment, because it failed to particularize what was to be searched for. Instead, it broadly authorized the seizure of my devices and “any and all files” within them—without limitation.
But the law is clear. The U.S. Supreme Court held in Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014), that “the wholesale seizure of every piece of data on a digital device is unconstitutional”. Similarly, in United States v. Galpin, 720 F.3d 436 (2d Cir. 2013), the court emphasized that digital searches must be narrowly constrained because of the immense volume of private data stored on modern devices. Other rulings like United States v. Ganias (2014), United States v. Winn (2015), and United States v. Morton (2021) reinforce this principle: law enforcement cannot seize or examine all digital content unless they have probable cause for each category of data.
So let’s be clear: this warrant wasn’t just procedurally flawed—it was structurally unconstitutional.
Furthermore, I requested a Franks hearing years ago, having made the required “substantial preliminary showing” that the affidavit used to obtain the warrant contained false statements or material omissions. It took nearly four years to even reach a scheduled hearing—and then, just days before it was set to occur, my attorney withdrew. That withdrawal wasn’t coincidental. It occurred under suspicious circumstances involving outside interference and communications from third parties, including someone who had a documented history of undermining my defense. This not only denied me the opportunity to challenge the warrant—it constituted a violation of my right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.
As for the bail order, it too was constitutionally flawed. Bail is supposed to be based on probable cause, and the court must weigh the totality of the circumstances (Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983)). Yet in my case, the State’s narrative was both incomplete and misleading. They told the court that I had been arrested in 2018 for allegedly making a threat, that my computers had been seized, and that the FBI had discovered an image on those devices. What they left out was critical:
That the original state charges were dismissed in April 2018 due to a lack of probable cause;
That the original warrant was quashed—and therefore the devices should have been returned;
That the image in question was found after the warrant had been quashed, meaning the search was unauthorized and constitutionally defective;
That the FBI waited nearly two years to obtain a second warrant, with no legal justification for that delay;
And that the federal government declined to prosecute, returning the matter to Illinois.
The courts have consistently held that delays in obtaining a warrant beyond 31 days are presumptively unreasonable, absent exigent circumstances (see United States v. Pratt, 915 F.3d 266 (4th Cir. 2019), among others). In this case, two years lapsed before new action was taken—a delay that undermines the validity of any subsequent search.
The bottom line is this: the State built its probable cause argument on a selectively crafted narrative that excluded exculpatory facts and procedural defects. That is not justice—it’s manipulation. And the bail conditions imposed as a result are tainted by that misrepresentation.
I respectfully assert that this entire case rests on constitutional violations that cannot be ignored or cured. The warrant was invalid. The search was unlawful. The Franks hearing was undermined. And the bail order rests on flawed and misleading information.
This is not how due process works.
And it’s not how justice is supposed to look.