08-27-2025, 07:38 PM
Just as what I have been saying, right down to good faith. Plus you can't afford as Franks Hearing and your lawyer and your lawyer alone determines it.
Where an affidavit supporting a search warrant included information that a woman contacted other parties through Facebook and text messages as part of a bribery scheme, that provided probable cause for a warrant allowing the search of her electronic devices.
Background
This matter is presently before the court on defendant Joshua Brady’s motion to suppress. Defendant’s challenge centers around a search warrant obtained and executed by the Chesterfield County Police Department, or CCPD. Defendant contends that the search warrant was not supported by probable cause and the delay between the seizure of his electronic devices by CCPD, and the subsequent execution of a federal search warrant to search the contents of the devices, violated the Fourth Amendment.
Analysis
Defendant argues that the search violated the Fourth Amendment because the affidavit did not contain sufficient information that would indicate that incriminating evidence would be located at the residence. Specifically, defendant states that the evidence in the affidavit was only sufficient to justify a search of defendant personally and his phone. Thus, what seems to be at issue is where incriminating evidence of witness bribery could be found, and the relationship between the evidence sought (all electronic devices) and the place to be searched (the listed address).
The search warrant at issue involved a search of 19820 Oak River Drive, for “any and all electronic devices, including but not limited to: computers, cell phones, all electronic storage devices, and the data contained therein.” The affidavit included information that defendant contacted another involved party through Facebook and text messages. The affidavit also indicated that defendant sent JE, the falsely accused rape perpetrator, threatening messages through Snapchat. These applications are both accessed via electronic devices making it reasonable for a magistrate to make the inference that they could be accessed on defendant’s computer as well as his phone.
Additionally, the affidavit included information that defendant told ME he had paid her for the false report using wire transfers. A wire transfer could be completed on a computer or other electronic device other than defendant’s phone. In fact, Detective Hartsook testified at the suppression hearing that, in her experience dealing with electronic evidence, there was a probability that this evidence could be accessed by, backed up to or saved to a computer.
While Detective Hartsook did not have direct evidence that defendant accessed these applications on his computer, “probable cause can be inferred from the circumstances, and a warrant is not invalid for failure to produce direct evidence.” A magistrate could find a substantial basis to conclude, based on the affidavit which describes the false report and bribery in detail, that evidence of the crime of bribery would be found on defendant’s electronic devices.
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the warrant was facially invalid, the good faith exception, as outlined in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (908), still bars suppression. Although defendant claims that “Detective Hartsook was reckless in omitting several material facts known to her, and which would have been material to the magistrate,” there is no evidence in the record that Detective Hartsook omitted these facts in an attempt to mislead the magistrate. Even if the evidence was included in the affidavit, moreover, it would not have defeated probable cause to search defendant’s residence. Indeed, some of the omitted facts may have strengthened probable cause.
Next, defendant argues that the delay between the state seizure of the devices and their subsequent search by federal agents constituted a violation of the Warrants Clause. The two cases he relies upon, however, both involved warrantless seizures followed by a delay in obtaining a warrant to search the seized items. In this case, by contrast, there was a valid search warrant at the time of the initial seizure. The state search warrant authorized not only seizure of all electronic devices, but also a search of their contents for evidence of the crime. Even if the cases relied upon by defendant extended to cases involving valid search warrants where there is a delay in the actual search, moreover, the delay here was justified.
Defendant’s motion to suppress denied.
Search warrant was supported by probable cause
Where an affidavit supporting a search warrant included information that a woman contacted other parties through Facebook and text messages as part of a bribery scheme, that provided probable cause for a warrant allowing the search of her electronic devices.
Background
This matter is presently before the court on defendant Joshua Brady’s motion to suppress. Defendant’s challenge centers around a search warrant obtained and executed by the Chesterfield County Police Department, or CCPD. Defendant contends that the search warrant was not supported by probable cause and the delay between the seizure of his electronic devices by CCPD, and the subsequent execution of a federal search warrant to search the contents of the devices, violated the Fourth Amendment.
Analysis
Defendant argues that the search violated the Fourth Amendment because the affidavit did not contain sufficient information that would indicate that incriminating evidence would be located at the residence. Specifically, defendant states that the evidence in the affidavit was only sufficient to justify a search of defendant personally and his phone. Thus, what seems to be at issue is where incriminating evidence of witness bribery could be found, and the relationship between the evidence sought (all electronic devices) and the place to be searched (the listed address).
The search warrant at issue involved a search of 19820 Oak River Drive, for “any and all electronic devices, including but not limited to: computers, cell phones, all electronic storage devices, and the data contained therein.” The affidavit included information that defendant contacted another involved party through Facebook and text messages. The affidavit also indicated that defendant sent JE, the falsely accused rape perpetrator, threatening messages through Snapchat. These applications are both accessed via electronic devices making it reasonable for a magistrate to make the inference that they could be accessed on defendant’s computer as well as his phone.
Additionally, the affidavit included information that defendant told ME he had paid her for the false report using wire transfers. A wire transfer could be completed on a computer or other electronic device other than defendant’s phone. In fact, Detective Hartsook testified at the suppression hearing that, in her experience dealing with electronic evidence, there was a probability that this evidence could be accessed by, backed up to or saved to a computer.
While Detective Hartsook did not have direct evidence that defendant accessed these applications on his computer, “probable cause can be inferred from the circumstances, and a warrant is not invalid for failure to produce direct evidence.” A magistrate could find a substantial basis to conclude, based on the affidavit which describes the false report and bribery in detail, that evidence of the crime of bribery would be found on defendant’s electronic devices.
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the warrant was facially invalid, the good faith exception, as outlined in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (908), still bars suppression. Although defendant claims that “Detective Hartsook was reckless in omitting several material facts known to her, and which would have been material to the magistrate,” there is no evidence in the record that Detective Hartsook omitted these facts in an attempt to mislead the magistrate. Even if the evidence was included in the affidavit, moreover, it would not have defeated probable cause to search defendant’s residence. Indeed, some of the omitted facts may have strengthened probable cause.
Next, defendant argues that the delay between the state seizure of the devices and their subsequent search by federal agents constituted a violation of the Warrants Clause. The two cases he relies upon, however, both involved warrantless seizures followed by a delay in obtaining a warrant to search the seized items. In this case, by contrast, there was a valid search warrant at the time of the initial seizure. The state search warrant authorized not only seizure of all electronic devices, but also a search of their contents for evidence of the crime. Even if the cases relied upon by defendant extended to cases involving valid search warrants where there is a delay in the actual search, moreover, the delay here was justified.
Defendant’s motion to suppress denied.