a few things I'm jolting down

[admin]

"[t]he proceeding by search warrant is a drastic one, and must be carefully circumscribed so as to prevent unauthorized invasions of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life." Berger v. New York,388 U.S. 41, 58, 87 S.Ct. 1873, 1883, 18 L.Ed.2d 1040 (1967) (quotations and citations omitted).
U.S. v. Jones, 54 F.3d 1285, 1289 (7th Cir. 1995)

"The requirement that warrants shall particularly describe the things to be seized makes general searches under them impossible and prevents the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another. As to what is to be taken, nothing is to be left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant." Marron v. United States,275 U.S. 192, 196, 48 S.Ct. 74, 76, 72 L.Ed. 231 (1927). "In practice, courts have therefore demanded that the executing officers be able to identify the things to be seized with reasonable certainty and that the warrant description must be as particular as circumstances permit." United States v. Brown,832 F.2d 991, 996 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 908, 108 S.Ct. 1084, 99 L.Ed.2d 243 (1988).
U.S. v. Jones, 54 F.3d 1285, 1290 (7th Cir. 1995)

[admin]

The Fourth Amendment prohibits general search warrants and requires that a warrant describe, with particularity, the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. U.S. Const. amend. IV. The purpose of the particularity requirement is to “protect persons against the government's indiscriminate rummaging through their property” and to “[prevent] the searching for and seizure of items that there is no probable cause to believe are either contraband or evidence of a crime” United States v. Jones, 54 F.3d 1285, 1289–90 (7th Cir.1995) (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971)); United States v. Sims, 553 F.3d 580, 582 (7th Cir.2009) (citing Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84–85, 107 S.Ct. 1013, 94 L.Ed.2d 72 (1987)). “By limiting the authorization to search to the specific areas and things for which there is probable cause to search, the requirement ensures that the search will be carefully tailored to its justifications, and will not take on the character of the wide-ranging exploratory searches the Framers intended to prohibit.” Garrison, 480 U.S. at 84, 107 S.Ct. 1013; United States v. Vitek Supply Corp., 144 F.3d 476, 481 (7th Cir.1998) (“This requirement ... ensures that the scope of a search will be confined to evidence relating to a specific crime that is supported by probable cause.”)

To satisfy the particularity requirement, a warrant “must describe the objects of the search with reasonable specificity, but need not be elaborately detailed.” Vitek Supply Corp., 144 F.3d at 481. “In practice, courts have ... demanded that the executing officers be able to identify the things to be seized with reasonable certainty and that the warrant description must be as particular as circumstances permit.” Jones, 54 F.3d at 1290 (citing United States v. Brown, 832 F.2d 991, 996 (7th Cir.1987)). Accord United States v. Yusuf, 461 F.3d 374, 395 (3d Cir.2006) (“The breadth of items to be searched depends upon the particular factual context of each case and also the information available to the investigating agent that could limit the search at the time the warrant application is given to the magistrate.”) Furthermore, when the search involves digital media, the Seventh Circuit has instructed police officers “to exercise caution to ensure that warrants describe with particularity the things to be seized and that searches are narrowly tailored to uncover only those things described.” United States v. Mann, 592 F.3d 779, 786 (7th Cir.2010).

United States v. Winn, 79 F. Supp. 3d 904, 918-19 (S.D. Ill. 2015)

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“The major, overriding problem with the description of the object of the search—“any or all files”—is that the police did not have probable cause to believe that everything on the phone was evidence of the crime of public indecency.” United States v. Winn, 79 F. Supp. 3d 904, 919 (S.D. Ill. 2015)

[admin]

The Supreme Court put the scope of such a wholesale seizure in perspective by explaining that it “would typically expose the government to far more than the most exhaustive search of a house.” Riley v. California, ––– U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 2473, 2491, 189 L.Ed.2d 430 (2014) (emphasis in original).

United States v. Winn, 79 F. Supp. 3d 904, 919 (S.D. Ill. 2015)

[admin]

Most importantly, the warrant should have specified the relevant time frame. The alleged criminal activity took place on one day only—June 18, 2014—and the police were looking for photos or videos taken that same day. There was nothing in the complaint indicating that any data created prior to that date was connected to the suspected public indecency. “Failure to limit broad descriptive terms by relevant dates, when such dates are available to the police, will render a warrant overbroad.”

United States v. Winn, 79 F. Supp. 3d 904, 921 (S.D. Ill. 2015)