Motion to Suppress

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Motion to Suppress 

November 19th, 2024

160.32.227.211/suppression/suppression.pdf

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That IS a general warrant. plain and simple, but for those out there who don't think it is, prove me wrong.

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Winn next argues that the search warrant violated the Fourth Amendment because it failed to state with particularity the items permitted to be seized (Doc. 22, pp. 6–8). It authorized the seizure of “any and all files” that constituted evidence of disorderly conduct which, according to Winn, essentially invited the police to conduct an illegal general search of his cell phone ( Id.). The Court agrees with Winn on this point.

The Fourth Amendment prohibits general search warrants and requires that a warrant describe, with particularity, the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. U.S. Const. amend. IV. The purpose of the particularity requirement is to “protect persons against the government's indiscriminate rummaging through their property” and to “[prevent] the searching for and seizure of items that there is no probable cause to believe are either contraband or evidence of a crime” United States v. Jones, 54 F.3d 1285, 1289–90 (7th Cir.1995) (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971)); United States v. Sims, 553 F.3d 580, 582 (7th Cir.2009) (citing Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84–85, 107 S.Ct. 1013, 94 L.Ed.2d 72 (1987)). “By limiting the authorization to search to the specific areas and things for which there is probable cause to search, the requirement ensures that the search will be carefully tailored to its justifications and will not take on the character of the wide-ranging exploratory searches the Framers intended to prohibit.” Garrison, 480 U.S. at 84, 107 S.Ct. 1013; United States v. Vitek Supply Corp., 144 F.3d 476, 481 (7th Cir.1998) (“This requirement ... ensures that the scope of a search will be confined to evidence relating to a specific crime that is supported by probable cause.”)

United States v. Winn, 79 F. Supp. 3d 904, 918 (S.D. Ill. 2015)

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To satisfy the particularity requirement, a warrant “must describe the objects of the search with reasonable specificity, but need not be elaborately detailed.” Vitek Supply Corp., 144 F.3d at 481. “In practice, courts have ... demanded that the executing officers be able to identify the things to be seized with reasonable certainty and that the warrant description must be as particular as circumstances permit.” Jones, 54 F.3d at 1290 (citing United States v. Brown, 832 F.2d 991, 996 (7th Cir.1987)). Accord United States v. Yusuf, 461 F.3d 374, 395 (3d Cir.2006) (“The breadth of items to be searched depends upon the particular factual context of each case and also the information available to the investigating agent that could limit the search at the time the warrant application is given to the magistrate.”) Furthermore, when the search involves digital media, the Seventh Circuit has instructed police officers “to exercise caution to ensure that warrants describe with particularity the things to be seized and that searches are narrowly tailored to uncover only those things described.” United States v. Mann, 592 F.3d 779, 786 (7th Cir.2010).

The warrant in this case particularly described the place of the search: the white Samsung Galaxy III cell phone. With regard to the objects of the search, however, the warrant was facially overbroad, exceeded the probable cause to support it, and was not as particular as the circumstances would allow.

United States v. Winn, 79 F. Supp. 3d 904, 918-19 (S.D. Ill. 2015)

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“"the court must . . . insist that the magistrate perform his `neutral and detached' function and not serve merely as a rubber stamp for police." Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 111 (1964)” U.S. v. Weaver, 99 F.3d 1372, 1376 (6th Cir. 1996)

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Another good case

https://caselaw.findlaw.com/court/ny-sup...38676.html

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The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, ․ and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the ․ things to be seized” (U.S. Const Amend IV).  The particularity requirement “prohibit[s] law enforcement agents from undertaking a general exploratory search of a person's belongings” (People v. Brown, 96 N.Y.2d 80, 84, 725 N.Y.S.2d 601, 749 N.E.2d 170).  “Indeed, indiscriminate searches pursuant to general warrants ‘were the immediate evils that motivated the framing and adoption of the Fourth Amendment’ ” (id. at 84, 725 N.Y.S.2d 601, 749 N.E.2d 170, quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639).  “ ‘[A] search conducted pursuant to a warrant that fails to conform to the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment is unconstitutional’ ” (Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 559, 124 S.Ct. 1284, 157 L.Ed.2d 1068, quoting Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 988 n 5, 104 S.Ct. 3424, 82 L.Ed.2d 737).

Here, the warrant failed to conform to that requirement.  Most notably, other than a date restriction covering a period of approximately five years, the warrant permitted the OAG to search and seize all computers, hard drives, and computer files stored on other devices, without any guidelines, parameters, or constraints on the type of items to be viewed and seized (see United States v. Rosa, 626 F.3d 56, 62 [2d Cir] [concluding that the subject warrant “violated the Fourth Amendment's proscription against general searches” where it “directed officers to seize and search certain electronic devices, but provided them with no guidance as to the type of evidence sought”]; United States v. Riccardi, 405 F.3d 852, 862–863 [10th Cir.] [determining that a warrant to search computer files was unconstitutional where it was not limited to any particular files or any particular crimes]; see generally United States v. Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078, 1091 [10th Cir.] [“If the warrant is read to allow a search of all computer records without description or limitation it would not meet the Fourth Amendment's particularity requirement”] ).  As has been observed by federal courts, where the property to be searched is computer files, “the particularity requirement assumes even greater importance” (United States v. Galpin, 720 F.3d 436, 446 [2d Cir.]) since “[t]he potential for privacy violations occasioned by an unbridled exploratory search” of such files is “enormous” (id. at 447).

Thus, the warrant at issue was precisely the kind of general warrant that the Federal Constitution prohibits (see United States v. Galpin, 720 F.3d at 447; United States v. Rosa, 626 F.3d at 62–64; see generally United States v. Burgess, 576 F.3d at 1091).  We recognize that, as our dissenting colleague points out, “courts may tolerate some ambiguity in the warrant so long as ‘law enforcement agents have done the best that could reasonably be expected under the circumstances, have acquired all the descriptive facts which a reasonable investigation could be expected to cover, and have insured that all those facts were included in the warrant’ ” (United States v. Galpin, 720 F.3d at 446, quoting United States v. Young, 745 F.2d 733, 759 [2d Cir.]).  Here, however, the OAG did not include descriptive facts in the warrant or even a recitation of the suspected crimes.  Thus, the OAG failed “to describe the items to be seized with as much particularity as the circumstances reasonably allow[ed]” (United States v. Galpin, 720 F.3d at 446 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see United States v. Leary, 846 F.2d at 604–605).  While our dissenting colleague focuses on the defendant's contention that the warrant failed to specify the crimes charged, it is not this failure alone, but that failure combined with the failure to include any other details or guidelines in the warrant that could serve to limit its reach to evidence related to the crimes for which the OAG had probable cause to believe were committed, that renders this particular warrant unconstitutional.

The OAG contends that the affidavit in support of the warrant rendered the warrant sufficiently particularized.  However, the United States Supreme Court has held that “[t]he Fourth Amendment by its terms requires particularity in the warrant, not in the supporting documents” (Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. at 557, 124 S.Ct. 1284).  That Court explained that the “high function” served by the presence of a search warrant is not served “when some other document, somewhere, says something about the objects of the search, but the contents of that document are neither known to the person whose [premises] is being searched nor available for her [or his] inspection” (id.).  Since the affidavit in support of the warrant was not incorporated by reference into the warrant, the affidavit “does not save the warrant from its facial invalidity” (id. [emphasis omitted] ).

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"The fourth amendment imposes a time-sensitive duty to diligently apply for a search warrant if an item has been seized for that very purpose, and all the more so if the has been warrantlessly seized"

(In regard to second search warrant issued two years after the computers were never returned and the original search warrant had been QUASHED)

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The Fourth Amendment protects the “right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. In order to “compel respect for the constitutional guaranty,” the United States Supreme Court created the exclusionary rule. Davis v. United States, ––– U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 2419, 2426, 180 L.Ed.2d 285 (2011) (citing Elkins v. United States,364 U.S. 206, 217, 80 S.Ct. 1437, 4 L.Ed.2d 1669 (1960)). When applicable, that rule forbids the use of evidence obtained by police officers in violation of the Fourth Amendment. It is well established, however, that a violation of the Fourth Amendment does not necessarily mean that the exclusionary rule applies. Herring v. United States,555 U.S. 135, 140, 129 S.Ct. 695, 172 L.Ed.2d 496 (2009) (“We have repeatedly rejected the argument that exclusion is a necessary consequence of a Fourth Amendment violation.”) It applies only when the benefits of deterring future Fourth Amendment violations outweighs the heavy costs of suppressing evidence. Herring,555 U.S. at 141, 129 S.Ct. 695. “The principal cost of applying the rule is, of course, letting guilty and possibly dangerous defendants go free.” Herring555 U.S. at 141, 129 S.Ct. 695 (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 908); Davis,131 S.Ct. at 2427 (“Exclusion exacts a heavy toll on both the judicial system and society at large” because “its bottom-line effect, in many cases, is to suppress the truth and set the criminal loose in the community without punishment.”) As a result, exclusion “has always been our last resort, not our first impulse.” Herring,555 U.S. at 140, 129 S.Ct. 695 (citing Hudson v. Michigan,547 U.S. 586, 591, 126 S.Ct. 2159, 165 L.Ed.2d 56 (2006)).

United States v. Winn, 79 F. Supp. 3d 904, 912-13 (S.D. Ill. 2015)