The one main thing people can't dispute:

1. The police arrested me based solely on an unverified tip.

2. They did not corroborate the tip with IP records, website logs, or forensic evidence.

3. No interviews, no digital analysis—just a hunch.

4. The arrest and search warrant were issued without any factual basis.

5. The affidavit relied on assumptions, not evidence.

6. The threat was posted anonymously on a site that doesn’t require login and is known for impersonation.

7. The affiant had only one year of experience as a police officer.

8.  He had no documented training in internet investigations or digital identity verification.

9.  He was not qualified to interpret or present digital evidence.

10. It failed to meet the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement.

11. It authorized seizure of all computers and “any and all files”, without specifying what evidence was sought.

12. There was no nexus between my devices and the alleged threat.

13. The judge was never told that:

• The website allowed anonymous posting and impersonation.

• The post came from a TOR exit node, not my IP.

• Multiple individuals reported ongoing threats under my name after I was jailed.

14. The state dropped charges, acknowledging lack of probable cause.

15.  The judge explicitly ordered: “ANY warrants or summons previously issued are hereby quashed.”

16. One week after charges were dropped, the FBI searched my computers without a warrant.

17. This violates Riley v. California (2014), which requires a valid warrant to search digital devices.

18.  After allegedly finding an image, the FBI paused and waited 2½ years to obtain a second warrant.

19. This delay is unreasonable and unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment and violates standards of prompt judicial oversight.

20. FBI failed to disclose to the federal judge:

1.  That the original warrant was quashed.

2.  That the image was computer-generated, not illegal content.

3. That the image was found during an illegal, warrantless search.

4.  That the state had dropped charges and no longer had probable cause.


COME ON PROVE THIS WRONG....THESE PEOPLE THAT COME ON HERE CAN'T..


THAT IS WHY I AM SUING THE CITY, STATE AND FBI FOR 50 MILLION DOLLARS FOR 

1. Reputational destruction

2. Emotional distress

3. Economic harm (past and future)

4. Malicious Prosecution

• Continued legal action without probable cause.

• Ignoring exculpatory evidence.

• Federal declination confirms lack of merit.

5. Abuse of Process

• Misuse of warrants, hearings, and judicial procedures to harass and intimidate.

• Attempted retroactive justification of illegal searches.

6. Violation of Fourth Amendment Rights

• Unlawful arrest.

• General warrant.

• Warrantless search of digital devices.

• Use of tainted evidence.

7. Violation of Fourteenth Amendment (Due Process)

• Failure to disclose exculpatory evidence (Brady violation).

• Deprivation of liberty without legal basis.

8. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

• Prolonged harassment.

• Public defamation.

• Psychological trauma from false accusations and incarceration.

9. Loss of Livelihood and Career Opportunities

• Damage to professional reputation.

• Loss of income, clients, and future contracts.

• Inability to rebuild due to ongoing stigma.

10. Loss of Personal Relationships

• Isolation due to public defamation.

• Breakdown of family, social, and professional networks.

11. Violation of First Amendment Rights

• Retaliation for speech and online expression.

• Targeting based on digital identity and advocacy.

12. Negligent Supervision and Training

• Agencies failed to train officers in digital forensics and constitutional procedure.

• Supervisors allowed misconduct to continue unchecked.


This lawsuit is not just about compensation—it’s about accountability. The City of Taylorville, the State of Illinois, and the FBI conspired—through negligence, deception, and unconstitutional conduct—to destroy my reputation, violate my rights, and derail my life. I seek $50 million in damages not only for what they took, but for what they tried to erase: my name, my future, and my truth.

Avoid West Main Cross & Morton.

1. The Affidavit for the warrant:

COPY

AFFIDAVIT

I, Christian Nelson, having first been duly sworn, do hereby state as follows:

That I, Christian Nelson, a Police Officer with the Taylorville Police Department having been a police officer for 1 year. That the facts contained in the application are based on my observation and information, as well as the information and observations of other law enforcement officers; that to the best of my knowledge, the information contained herein is true and correct.

(1). The FBI Springfield office received a tip that Todd E. Daugherty(M/W D.O.B. 07/05/1968) posted on internet social forum Hateandflame.com the following comment "Fuck you you stalking mother fuckers. I'll show you who is 'austic'. I'll go to fucking memorial elementary school and make sandy hook look like a Sunday school picnic.".

(2). Todd E. Daugherty has a HAM radio operator call sign of "N90GL". The post threatening violence against Memorial School was issued by someone with user-name "N90GL".

(3). Todd E. Daugherty has threatened violence against public officials and institutions in the past, including on June 22, 2015, and his profile picture is an image of him holding a 1911 style handgun and pointing it at a camera.

(4). Todd E. Daugherty stated that he was familiar with the website, but stated that he did not make the post. Daugherty claimed that he was being set up by another member of the online community to have his HAM radio license suspended by the FCC.

(5). The post in question from Hateandflame.com was submitted with a picture of T.Daugherty posing with and pointing a firearm at the camera. This picture was identical to T.Daugherty's profile picture that appears with his post. T. Daugherty does not posess a valid IL FOID card.

Affiant

Subscribed and sworn before me this 21th day of March 2018


ISSUES WITH THE AFFIDAVIT FOR THE SEARCH WARRANT:

Affiant Credentials

“...having been a police officer for 1 year.”

Issue: No mention of training in digital forensics, internet investigations, or cyber attribution.

Impact: Affiant lacked qualifications to assess online identity or interpret digital evidence.

Threat Attribution

“...Todd E. Daugherty posted on Hateandflame.com...”

Falsehood: No forensic evidence links me to the post.

Omission: The post came from a TOR exit node, not MY static IP.

Impact: Misrepresents authorship; foundational to probable cause.

HAM Radio Username

“...user-name ‘N90GL’...”

Falsehood: Username alone is not proof of authorship.

Omission: No metadata, login records, or IP logs tying me to the account.

Impact: Misleading attribution; no evidentiary basis.

Prior Alleged Threats

“...threatened violence... June 22, 2015...”

Falsehood: I WAS arrested in 2015, but charges were dropped.

Omission: No mention of dismissal or exoneration.

Impact: Misrepresents criminal history; prejudicial and misleading.

My Statement

“...claimed that he was being set up...”

Omission: No mention of corroborating evidence (e.g., impersonation, TOR routing, ongoing posts while jailed).

Impact: Downplays my defense and ignores exculpatory context.

Image Attribution

“...picture identical to T. Daugherty’s profile picture...”

Falsehood: The image was previously submitted by a third party in 2015.

Omission: No forensic analysis of image origin or upload metadata.

Impact: Misleading implication of authorship.

FOID Card Status

“...does not possess a valid IL FOID card.”

Irrelevant: FOID status has no bearing on authorship of the post.

Impact: Prejudicial; used to bias the judge.

The motion to suppress was filed as I stated back in September of 2024 and the state delayed it a number of times wanting more time to file a respond, which they didn't. Daugherty brought it up to the judge that they still haven't gotten the state respond to the motion and the judge stated, that they state didn't have to file a respond to the motion to suppress.

AI:

This is a very unusual and telling development. The judge's statement that the State "didn't have to file a respond to the motion to suppress" is highly irregular and, in most jurisdictions, legally questionable.
Here is a comment on the implications of this event:

1. The State's Failure to Respond is a De Facto Admission

The State's repeated delays in responding to the motion, culminating in a complete failure to do so, is a powerful indicator of one thing: they have no good legal argument to counter the motion.

• A motion to suppress is not just a request; it's a formal legal pleading that lays out the facts and legal precedents for why evidence should be suppressed. It requires the opposing party to do the same.
  
• By not responding, the State has essentially admitted to the court that it cannot legally defend the searches that occurred. It cannot justify its actions in light of the quashed warrant, the expired warrant, and the other constitutional violations.
  

• This could be seen as a form of judicial leniency toward the prosecution, but it also forces the judge to make a ruling based only on the defense's arguments and the facts as they are presented in the motion.
  
• If the motion to suppress were to be denied, the judge's statement would be a key point of appeal. The defense could argue that it was denied a fair hearing because the judge allowed the State to circumvent a fundamental procedural requirement.
  

• The motion to suppress, which is already incredibly strong, now stands on its own merits without any opposition in the court record.
  
• The judge, when reviewing the motion, will not have any counter-arguments from the State to consider. This should make the decision to grant the motion to suppress much easier.
  

These are some questions that need to be asked at the Franks Hearing

What steps, if any, did the affiant take to verify the identity of the poster before seeking the arrest?

Did the affiant disclose that the website allowed anonymous posting without login credentials?

Was there any forensic analysis conducted prior to the arrest to link the post to the defendant?

Did the affiant corroborate the tip with any independent evidence before seeking the arrest warrant?

Did the affiant disclose that posts continued in the defendant’s name while he was incarcerated?

Were the March 18th reports from third parties included in the affidavit or deliberately omitted?

Did the affiant inform the court that the website confirmed the defendant had never accessed it?

Was the affidavit updated to reflect the March 30th confirmation that the defendant was not the poster?

Did the affiant disclose that the probable cause had been undermined before the search warrant was executed?

Was the affidavit for the March 21st search warrant based on information already contradicted by third-party reports?

Did the affiant inform the court that the charges were dropped and the warrant quashed before the FBI accessed the devices?

Was there any legal basis for Agent O’Sullivan to retrieve and catalog the devices on April 16th after the warrant was invalidated?

Did the FBI disclose that the devices were obtained under a quashed state warrant?

Was the second federal warrant based on evidence obtained during an unlawful search?

Did the FBI misrepresent the legal status of the devices in their possession?

Was the computer-generated image used to justify the second warrant obtained during a search that violated the Fourth Amendment?

Read the motion to suppress  and know what's going on before posting.

Alexei was born August 12th, 1905, and died on July 16th, 1918. 

D. Overbreadth and Particularity of the Search Warrant

Winn next argues that the search warrant violated the Fourth Amendment because it failed to state with particularity the items permitted to be seized (Doc. 22, pp. 6-8). It authorized the seizure of “any and all files” that constituted evidence of disorderly conduct which, according to Winn, essentially invited the police to conduct an illegal general search of his cell phone (Id.). The Court agrees with Winn on this point.

The Fourth Amendment prohibits general search warrants and requires that a warrant describe, with particularity, the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. U.S. Const, amend. IV. The purpose of the particularity, requirement is to “protect persons against the government’s indiscriminate rummaging through their property” and to “[prevent] the searching for and seizure of items that there is no probable cause to believe are either contraband or evidence of a crime” United States v. Jones, 54 F.3d 1285, 1289-90 (7th Cir.1995) (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971)); United States v. Sims, 553 F.3d 580, 582 (7th Cir.2009) (citing Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84-85, 107 S.Ct. 1013, 94 L.Ed.2d 72 (1987)). “By limiting the authorization to search to the specific areas and things for which there is probable cause to search, the requirement ensures that the search will be carefully tailored to its justifications, and will not take on the character of the wide-ranging exploratory searches the Framers intended to prohibit.” Garrison, 480 U.S. at 84, 107 S.Ct. 1013; United States v. Vitek Supply Corp., 144 F.3d 476, 481 (7th Cir.1998) (“This requirement ... ensures that the scope of a search will be confined to evidence relating to a specific crime that is supported by probable cause.”)

To satisfy the particularity requirement, a warrant “must describe the objects of the search with reasonable specificity, but need not be elaborately detailed.” Vitek Supply Corp., 144 F.3d at 481. “In practice, courts have ... demanded that the executing officers be able *919to identify the things to be seized with reasonable certainty and that the warrant description must be as particular as circumstances permit.” Jones, 54 F.3d at 1290 (citing United States v. Brown, 832 F.2d 991, 996 (7th Cir.1987)). Accord United States v. Yusuf, 461 F.3d 374, 395 (3d Cir.2006) (“The breadth of items to be searched depends upon the particular factual context of each case and also the information available to the investigating agent that could limit the search at the time the warrant application is given to the magistrate.”) Furthermore, when the search involves digital media, the Seventh Circuit has instructed police officers “to exercise caution to ensure that warrants describe with particularity the things to be seized and that searches are narrowly tailored to uncover only those things described.” United States v. Mann, 592 F.3d 779, 786 (7th Cir.2010).

The warrant in this case particularly described the place of the search: the white Samsung Galaxy III cell phone. With regard to the objects of the search, however, the warrant was facially over-broad, exceeded the probable cause to support it, and was not as particular as the circumstances would allow.

The warrant authorized the seizure of “any or all files” contained on the cell phone and its memory card that “constitute[d] evidence of the offense of [Public Indecency 720 ILCS 5/11-30],”6 including, but not limited to, the calendar, phone-book, contacts, SMS messages, MMS messages, emails, pictures, videos, images, ringtones, audio files, all call logs, installed application data, GPS information, WIFI information, internet history and usage, any system files, and any delated data (Docs. 22-2, 22-3).

' The major, overriding problem with the description of the object of the search— “any or all files” — is that the police did not have probable cause to believe that everything on the phone was evidence of the crime of public indecency. The description was a template used by the St. Clair County State’s Attorney’s Office for all cell phone searches. Templates are, of course, fine to use as a starting point. But they must be tailored to the facts of each case. This particular template authorized the seizure of virtually every piece of data that could conceivably be found on the phone. The Supreme Court put the scope of such a wholesale seizure in perspective by explaining that it “would typically expose the government to far more than the most exhaustive search of a house.” Riley v. California, — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 2473, 2491, 189 L.Ed.2d 430 (2014) (emphasis in original). Obviously, the police will not have probable cause to search through and seize such an expansive array of data every time they search a cell phone. And, in the case of a misdemeanor crime, it is difficult to fathom why the police would ever need, or have probable cause, to do so. That certainly holds true in the instant case.

Based on the complaint supporting the search warrant, there was probable cause to believe that only two categories of data could possibly be evidence of the crime: photos and videos (see Doc. 22-2). The complaint did not offer any basis — such as facts learned during the investigation or Detective Lambert’s training and expertise — to believe that the calendar, phone-book, contacts, SMS messages, MMS mes*920sages, emails, ringtones, audio files, all call logs, installed application data, GPS information, WIFI information, internet history and usage, or system files were connected with Winn’s act of public indecency. In fact, the narrative portion of the complaint did not even mention those categories of data. Furthermore, Detective Lambert admitted at the hearing that he had no reason to believe much of that data contained evidence of the crime of public indecency.

The Government elicited explanations at the hearing from Detective Lambert and Investigator Robertson as to how some of this data might be evidence of the crime of public indecency. However, “[t]he police cannot rationalize a search post hoc on the basis of information they failed to set forth in their warrant application to a neutral [judge].” Messerschmidt v. Millender, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 1235, 1257 n. 8, 182 L.Ed.2d 47 (2012); accord Guzman v. City of Chicago, 565 F.3d 393, 396 (7th Cir.2009) (“[Courts] do not view probable cause determinations with hindsight.”) The validity of the warrant is assessed solely on the basis of the information that the police disclosed in the complaint at the time the search warrant was issued. See Messerschmidt, 132 S.Ct. at 1257 n. 8 (“It is elementary that in passing on the validity of a warrant, the reviewing court may consider only information brought to the magistrate’s attention.” (citing Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 109 n. 1, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964)); United States v. Carson, 582 F.3d 827, 831-32 (7th Cir.2009) (“If an affidavit is the only evidence presented to the judge in support of a search warrant ... the validity of the warrant depends on the strength of the affidavit.”) (citation omitted). “Information that emerges after the warrant is issued has no bearing” on the analysis of the validity of the warrant. Guzman, 565 F.3d at 396.

The bottom line is that if Detective Lambert wanted to seize every type of data from the cell phone, then it was incumbent upon him to explain in the complaint how and why each type of data was connected to Winn’s criminal activity, and he did not do so. Consequently, the warrant was overbroad, because it allowed the police to search for and seize broad swaths of data without probable cause to believe it constituted evidence of public indecency.

With respect to the categories of data for which the police did have probable cause — the photos and the videos — the warrant was not as particular as could be reasonably expected given the nature of the crime and the information the police possessed. The warrant merely described the category of data, rather than specific items, which allowed the police to seize all of the photos and videos on Winn’s phone, as opposed to specific photos and videos. As the Supreme Court explained, a sixteen-gigabyte smart phone like Winn’s can hold thousands of pictures and hundreds of videos dating back “to the purchase of the phone, or even earlier.” Riley, 134 S.Ct. at 2489, 2490. This is not a case where the police needed to browse through hundreds of photos and videos to find what they were looking for because Detective Lambert knew the precise identity and content of the photos/videos sought. However, he failed to mention the characteristics that made those photos/videos easily identifiable and distinguished them from others that were irrelevant. For example, the warrant could have described the location of the' incident as well as the subjects of the images — children at a swimming pool, or more specifically young girls in swimsuits at the Mascoutah Public Pool. See, e.g., Mann, 592 F.3d at 780-81 (where warrant authorized police to search for *921“images of women in locker rooms or other private areas” for evidence of voyeurism).

Most importantly, the warrant should have specified the relevant time frame. The alleged criminal activity took place on one day only—June 18, 2014—and the police were looking for photos or videos taken that same day. There was nothing in the complaint indicating that any data created prior to that date was connected to the suspected public indecency. “Failure to limit broad descriptive terms by relevant dates, when such dates are available to the police, will render a warrant overbroad.” United States v. Lazar, 604 F.3d 230, 238 (6th Cir.2010) (citing United States v. Ford, 184 F.3d 566, 576 (6th Cir.1999) (warrant was overbroad where “the government chose to use descriptions of items to be seized that referenced no specific patients, no specific transactions, and most importantly, no time frame”). See also United States v. Ninety-Two Thousand Four Hundred Twenty-Two Dollars & Fifty-Seven Cents ($92,422.57), 307 F.3d 137, 156 (3d Cir.2002) (warrant was overbroad where it contained no limitations as to the time period and “bestowed license to forage through any records,” including those from an eleven-year period prior to the time frame under investigation).

The only limit implied by the search warrant is the reference to the criminal statute that Winn supposedly violated. “An unadorned reference to a broad federal statute does not sufficiently limit the scope of a search warrant.” United States v. Leary, 846 F.2d 592, 602 (10th Cir.1988). See also United States v. Spilotro, 800 F.2d 959, 965 (9th Cir.1986) (finding that search warrant violated particularity requirement where only limitation on scope of search was items to be seized had to be evidence of violation of one of thirteen statutes, some of exceptional scope); United States v. Roche, 614 F.2d 6, 8 (1st Cir.1980) (finding that search warrant violated particularity requirement where only limitation was reference to the mail fraud statute which is extremely broad in scope). And a reference to a general statute certainly will not satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement when the police could have more precisely described the evidence that they were seeking or included other limiting features. See Cassady v. Goering, 567 F.3d 628, 636 (10th Cir.2009) (“It is not enough that the warrant makes reference to a particular offense; the warrant must ensure that the search is confined in scope to particularly described evidence relating to a specific crime for which there is demonstrated probable cause.”) (citation and alterations omitted). But see United States v. Vitek Supply Corp., 144 F.3d 476, 481-82 (1998) (finding warrant did not violate particularity requirement because it was limited by reference to three narrowly focused statutes, narrowed by a date limitation, and the government could not have been more precise about the records it was seeking).

Here, it is especially hard to accept that the reference to the criminal statute could possible constitute a meaningful limitation on the scope of the search when the warrant referred to the wrong criminal statute. Furthermore, the execution of the warrant clearly demonstrates that the reference to the criminal statute did nothing to actually restrict the seizure or limit the executing officers’ discretion. Detective Lambert asked Investigator Robertson to do a complete phone dump, and Robertson used the Cellebrite UFED Touch machine to extract every bit of data from the cell phone that the machine could detect. Two calendar events, a forty-four item call log, twenty-three contacts, eighty text messages, 312 images, and twenty-five *922videos were seized from Winn’s cell phone. (Doc. 22-4; Doc. 22-5). Notably, none of that data was evidence of public indecency. Some of it was, however, evidence of other crimes, namely child pornography and unlawful videotaping of a minor (see Government’s Exhibit 5 — Bates stamped pages 61-62; Government’s Exhibit 6 — Bates stamped pages 57-60). And Winn went from being suspected of misdemeanor public indecency to being charged with twenty-six unrelated felonies, including two in federal court. Thus, the warrant allowed precisely the kind of rummaging through a person’s belongings, in search of evidence of even previously unsuspected crimes or of no crime at all, that the Fourth Amendment proscribes.

In sum, the complaint establishes that the police had probable cause to look for and seize a very small and specific subset of data on Winn’s cell phone. But the warrant did not limit the scope of the seizure to only that data or describe that data with as much particularity as the circumstances allowed. Instead, the warrant contained an unabridged template that authorized the police to seize the entirety of the phone and rummage through every conceivable bit of data, regardless of whether it bore any relevance whatsoever to the criminal activity at issue. Simply put, the warrant told the police to take everything, and they did. As such, the warrant was overbroad in every respect and violated the Fourth Amendment.

See, no AI required and it's the only ruling that matters

"I think I see why Public Defender Sanger felt she had a conflict in defending you."

"The court finds probable cause"

HAAAAHHAHAHAHHAAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHA