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“At the same time, the warrant authorized the wholesale seizure of all electronic devices discovered in the apartment, including items owned by third parties. In those circumstances, we conclude that the warrant was unsupported by probable cause and unduly broad in its reach.” United States v. Griffith, 867 F.3d 1265, 1270-71 (D.C. Cir. 2017)
“Although we pay "great deference" to the judge's initial determination of probable cause, a warrant application cannot rely merely on "conclusory statement[s]." Id. at 236, 239, 103 S.Ct. 2317 (citing Nathanson v. United States , 290 U.S. 41, 54 S.Ct. 11, 78 L.Ed. 159 (1933) ).” United States v. Griffith, 867 F.3d 1265, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 2017)
The Supreme Court has long distinguished between arrest warrants and search warrants. See Steagald v. United States , 451 U.S. 204, 212-13, 101 S.Ct. 1642, 68 L.Ed.2d 38 (1981). An arrest warrant rests on probable cause to believe that the suspect committed an offense; it thus primarily serves to protect an individual's liberty interest against an unreasonable seizure of his person. Id. at 213, 101 S.Ct. 1642. A search warrant, by contrast, is grounded in "probable cause to believe that the legitimate object of a search is located in a particular place." Id. Rather than protect an individual's person, a search warrant "safeguards an individual's interest in the privacy of his home and possessions against the unjustified intrusion of the police."
United States v. Griffith, 867 F.3d 1265, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 2017)
Regardless of whether an individual is validly suspected of committing a crime, an application for a search warrant concerning his property or possessions must demonstrate cause to believe that "evidence is likely to be found at the place to be searched." Groh v. Ramirez , 540 U.S. 551, 568, 124 S.Ct. 1284, 157 L.Ed.2d 1068 (2004). Moreover, "[t]here must, of course, be a nexus ... between the item to be seized and criminal behavior." Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden , 387 U.S. 294, 307, 87 S.Ct. 1642, 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967).
United States v. Griffith, 867 F.3d 1265, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 2017)
The Fourth Amendment requires that warrants "particularly describe" the "things to be seized." U.S. Const. amend. IV. That condition "ensures that the search will be carefully tailored to its justifications, and will not take on the character of the wide-ranging exploratory searches the Framers intended to prohibit." Garrison , 480 U.S. at 84, 107 S.Ct. 1013. Consequently, a warrant with an "indiscriminate sweep" is "constitutionally intolerable." Stanford v. Texas , 379 U.S. 476, 486, 85 S.Ct. 506, 13 L.Ed.2d 431 (1965). We will hold a warrant invalid when "overly broad." United States v. Maxwell , 920 F.2d 1028, 1033-34 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
United States v. Griffith, 867 F.3d 1265, 1275 (D.C. Cir. 2017)
The warrant's overbreadth is particularly notable because police sought to seize otherwise lawful objects: electronic devices. Courts have allowed more latitude in connection with searches for contraband items like "weapons [or] narcotics." Stanford , 379 U.S. at 486, 85 S.Ct. 506 (internal quotation marks omitted). But the understanding is different when police seize "innocuous" objects. See Andresen v. Maryland , 427 U.S. 463, 482 n.11, 96 S.Ct. 2737, 49 L.Ed.2d 627 (1976). Those circumstances call for special "care to assure [the search is] conducted in a manner that minimizes unwarranted intrusions upon privacy." Id. ; see also 2 LaFave, Search & Seizure § 4.6(d).
United States v. Griffith, 867 F.3d 1265, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 2017)
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