People of the State of Illinois v JOHN T. McCAVITT 2019 (Illinois Court of Appeals)

http://160.32.227.211/3170830.pdf


All property seized must be returned to its rightful owner once the criminal proceedings have terminated. Cooper v. City of Greenwood , 904 F.2d 302, 304 (5th Cir. 1990) ; United States v. Farrell , 606 F.2d 1341, 1343 (D.C. Cir. 1979) ; United States v. LaFatch , 565 F.2d 81, 83 (6th Cir. 1977). When no charges are pending against an individual, any of the individual's property in the possession of the State should be immediately returned to him. See People v. Jaudon , 307 Ill. App. 3d 427, 447, 241 Ill.Dec. 76, 718 N.E.2d 647 (1999) (citing 725 ILCS 5/108-2 (West 1996) ); People v. Jackson , 26 Ill. App. 3d 845, 848-49, 326 N.E.2d 138 (1975). After criminal proceedings conclude, the government has no right to retain a defendant's property.  United States v. Rodriguez-Aguirre , 264 F.3d 1195, 1213 (10th Cir. 2001). "t is fundamental to the integrity of the criminal justice process that property involved in the proceeding, against which no Government claim lies, be returned promptly to its rightful owner." United States v. Wilson , 540 F.2d 1100, 1103 (D.C. Cir. 1976).

People v. McCavitt, 438 Ill. Dec. 102, 109 (Ill. App. Ct. 2019)

“The major, overriding problem with the description of the object of the search—“any or all files”—is that the police did not have probable cause to believe that everything on the phone was evidence of the crime of public indecency.” United States v. Winn, 79 F. Supp. 3d 904, 919 (S.D. Ill. 2015)

The Supreme Court put the scope of such a wholesale seizure in perspective by explaining that it “would typically expose the government to far more than the most exhaustive search of a house.” Riley v. California, ––– U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 2473, 2491, 189 L.Ed.2d 430 (2014) (emphasis in original).

United States v. Winn, 79 F. Supp. 3d 904, 919 (S.D. Ill. 2015)

"I can't see a court allow a general search warrant, after all they are unconstitutional, and it's been well established by the courts that they are unconstitutional. (Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927) all the way to (Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551 (2004)" (Daugherty 2024)

“At the same time, the warrant authorized the wholesale seizure of all electronic devices discovered in the apartment, including items owned by third parties. In those circumstances, we conclude that the warrant was unsupported by probable cause and unduly broad in its reach.” United States v. Griffith, 867 F.3d 1265, 1270-71 (D.C. Cir. 2017)


“Although we pay "great deference" to the judge's initial determination of probable cause, a warrant application cannot rely merely on "conclusory statement[s]." Id. at 236, 239, 103 S.Ct. 2317 (citing Nathanson v. United States , 290 U.S. 41, 54 S.Ct. 11, 78 L.Ed. 159 (1933) ).” United States v. Griffith, 867 F.3d 1265, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 2017)


The Supreme Court has long distinguished between arrest warrants and search warrants. See Steagald v. United States , 451 U.S. 204, 212-13, 101 S.Ct. 1642, 68 L.Ed.2d 38 (1981). An arrest warrant rests on probable cause to believe that the suspect committed an offense; it thus primarily serves to protect an individual's liberty interest against an unreasonable seizure of his person. Id. at 213, 101 S.Ct. 1642. A search warrant, by contrast, is grounded in "probable cause to believe that the legitimate object of a search is located in a particular place." Id. Rather than protect an individual's person, a search warrant "safeguards an individual's interest in the privacy of his home and possessions against the unjustified intrusion of the police."
United States v. Griffith, 867 F.3d 1265, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 2017)

Regardless of whether an individual is validly suspected of committing a crime, an application for a search warrant concerning his property or possessions must demonstrate cause to believe that "evidence is likely to be found at the place to be searched." Groh v. Ramirez , 540 U.S. 551, 568, 124 S.Ct. 1284, 157 L.Ed.2d 1068 (2004). Moreover, "[t]here must, of course, be a nexus ... between the item to be seized and criminal behavior." Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden , 387 U.S. 294, 307, 87 S.Ct. 1642, 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967).
United States v. Griffith, 867 F.3d 1265, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 2017)


The Fourth Amendment requires that warrants "particularly describe" the "things to be seized." U.S. Const. amend. IV. That condition "ensures that the search will be carefully tailored to its justifications, and will not take on the character of the wide-ranging exploratory searches the Framers intended to prohibit." Garrison , 480 U.S. at 84, 107 S.Ct. 1013. Consequently, a warrant with an "indiscriminate sweep" is "constitutionally intolerable." Stanford v. Texas , 379 U.S. 476, 486, 85 S.Ct. 506, 13 L.Ed.2d 431 (1965). We will hold a warrant invalid when "overly broad." United States v. Maxwell , 920 F.2d 1028, 1033-34 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
United States v. Griffith, 867 F.3d 1265, 1275 (D.C. Cir. 2017)


The warrant's overbreadth is particularly notable because police sought to seize otherwise lawful objects: electronic devices. Courts have allowed more latitude in connection with searches for contraband items like "weapons [or] narcotics." Stanford , 379 U.S. at 486, 85 S.Ct. 506 (internal quotation marks omitted). But the understanding is different when police seize "innocuous" objects. See Andresen v. Maryland , 427 U.S. 463, 482 n.11, 96 S.Ct. 2737, 49 L.Ed.2d 627 (1976). Those circumstances call for special "care to assure [the search is] conducted in a manner that minimizes unwarranted intrusions upon privacy." Id. ; see also 2 LaFave, Search & Seizure § 4.6(d).
United States v. Griffith, 867 F.3d 1265, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 2017)

Anything on the internet could be considered social media (Packingham v North Carolina - US Supreme Court 2017)

The Court held that social media—defined broadly to include Facebook, Amazon.com, The Washington Post, and WebMD—is a "protected space" under the First Amendment for lawful speech (Packingham v North Carolina - US Supreme Court 2017)

42 U.S. Code § 1983 - Civil action for deprivation of rights

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.


(R.S. § 1979; Pub. L. 96–170, § 1, Dec. 29, 1979, 93 Stat. 1284; Pub. L. 104–317, title III, § 309©, Oct. 19, 1996, 110 Stat. 3853.)


"the Court held that social media—defined broadly to include Facebook, Amazon.com, The Washington Post, and WebMD—is a "protected space" under the First Amendment for lawful speech.

Justice Anthony Kennedy explained the decision: "A fundamental principle of the First Amendment is that all persons have access to places where they can speak and listen, and then, after reflection, speak and listen once more."

"... sources for knowing current events, checking ads for employment, speaking and listening in the modern public square, and otherwise exploring the vast realms of human thought and knowledge."

"It is well established that, as a general rule, the Government 'may not suppress lawful speech as the means to suppress unlawful speech'."

The Fourth Amendment prohibits general search warrants and requires that a warrant describe, with particularity, the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. U.S. Const. amend. IV. The purpose of the particularity requirement is to “protect persons against the government's indiscriminate rummaging through their property” and to “[prevent] the searching for and seizure of items that there is no probable cause to believe are either contraband or evidence of a crime” United States v. Jones, 54 F.3d 1285, 1289–90 (7th Cir.1995) (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971)); United States v. Sims, 553 F.3d 580, 582 (7th Cir.2009) (citing Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84–85, 107 S.Ct. 1013, 94 L.Ed.2d 72 (1987)). “By limiting the authorization to search to the specific areas and things for which there is probable cause to search, the requirement ensures that the search will be carefully tailored to its justifications, and will not take on the character of the wide-ranging exploratory searches the Framers intended to prohibit.” Garrison, 480 U.S. at 84, 107 S.Ct. 1013; United States v. Vitek Supply Corp., 144 F.3d 476, 481 (7th Cir.1998) (“This requirement ... ensures that the scope of a search will be confined to evidence relating to a specific crime that is supported by probable cause.”)

To satisfy the particularity requirement, a warrant “must describe the objects of the search with reasonable specificity, but need not be elaborately detailed.” Vitek Supply Corp., 144 F.3d at 481. “In practice, courts have ... demanded that the executing officers be able to identify the things to be seized with reasonable certainty and that the warrant description must be as particular as circumstances permit.” Jones, 54 F.3d at 1290 (citing United States v. Brown, 832 F.2d 991, 996 (7th Cir.1987)). Accord United States v. Yusuf, 461 F.3d 374, 395 (3d Cir.2006) (“The breadth of items to be searched depends upon the particular factual context of each case and also the information available to the investigating agent that could limit the search at the time the warrant application is given to the magistrate.”) Furthermore, when the search involves digital media, the Seventh Circuit has instructed police officers “to exercise caution to ensure that warrants describe with particularity the things to be seized and that searches are narrowly tailored to uncover only those things described.” United States v. Mann, 592 F.3d 779, 786 (7th Cir.2010).

United States v. Winn, 79 F. Supp. 3d 904, 918-19 (S.D. Ill. 2015)

Stuff like this.. (and several dozen more, including your threat to kill people in the courthouse and burn it down) The judge will read it in court, and "you're have a chance to explain yourself". My "friend" is emailing her now. And she'll have to disclose it all.

I hope you spend the summer in that unair-conditioned jail while it takes a few months for new council to get up to speed on your case.

Nope, I have a static IP address I always have. We have high speed fiber optic internet 1gb up and 1 gb down is the speed, and my IP address is fixed. Second documents from the ISP of the website hate and flame, provide by their lawyer showed that I was never on that site period. 




DNS stands for Domain Name Service, which is for websites. The police were and still are under the impression that the Hate and Flame website belong to be. This however is NOT true, I had nothing to do with that site. In fact, when they came to my house on March 17th in 2018, they stated they wanted to talk to me about something that I posted on my website Hate and Flame. I informed them that night that the site hate and flame was NOT my site. This was later confirmed on March 30th, 2018

Here some notes from some emails I wrote, the persons they were sent too were left out. This is basically what I said:


Here’s the bottom line: this entire case hinges on a single image that was obtained through an illegal search.

In 2018, both the State and the police determined they no longer had probable cause—the original charges were dropped, and the warrant was quashed. At that point, my computers should have been returned to me. Instead, law enforcement ignored that legal conclusion and, still convinced I had made the threat, handed the devices over to the FBI days after probable cause had already collapsed.

That handoff—and the subsequent search—was unconstitutional. This is a case built on an unlawful search and seizure, carried out without a valid warrant or legal basis.

******

Following up on my previous messages, I want to express—in no uncertain terms—the core issues that continue to undermine the integrity of this case:

1. It has taken over four years to obtain a Franks hearing. That kind of delay is not only unjustified, it’s unprecedented. A Franks hearing is narrowly focused and procedural—it does not take years to schedule unless someone is actively working to obstruct it.

2. The motion to withdraw came just one week before we were finally set to have that hearing. That timing alone raises serious red flags. After waiting four years, a sudden disruption right before the hearing is not just suspect—it appears deliberate.

3. It’s even more troubling when you consider that the motion to suppress was filed in September 2024—and the State still hasn't responded. Nearly a year of silence from the prosecution on a constitutional challenge is unconscionable.

4. This pattern of delay has caused considerable strain and frustration. To be candid, the only reason I started my public forum in the first place was to give voice to that frustration and to draw attention to the court's unwillingness to move on a hearing that should have been resolved years ago.

5. These delays are not benign. They have deprived me of a fair and timely process. The courts have allowed this case to fester in limbo, while critical facts—such as the invalidity of the original warrant and the State's suppression of exculpatory evidence—go unaddressed.

6. All of this contributes to a broader picture of systemic indifference and potential interference. From third parties communicating with the Public Defender’s office and external actors contacting civil rights attorneys on my behalf, to misrepresentations made to the court about the origin of the evidence—all of it points to a process badly in need of course correction.

I hope this adds clarity to my concerns. Let me know if you need anything from me before the 23rd.

******

First, the document in question—a motion to dismiss—was not written by me. It was prepared and filed by my attorney. Despite impressions to the contrary, I did not author that motion.

Second, the CSAM allegation is based on a computer-generated image, which is not illegal under federal law or Illinois state law. That distinction matters, and it undermines the basis for the search.

Third, the search itself was conducted without a valid warrant. Even if the original warrant had not been quashed, it was constitutionally flawed from the start: it was a general warrant issued by the state in 2018 that failed to describe with particularity what digital content was to be seized. Law enforcement seized all data from 15 devices, a sweeping action that violated established constitutional protections.

This kind of broad, indiscriminate digital search was precisely what the U.S. Supreme Court condemned in Riley v. California (2014). In that decision, the Court made clear that modern digital devices cannot be subject to blanket searches—doing so without clear judicial authorization is a violation of the Fourth Amendment.

I appreciate the suggestion that court delays may be due to judicial utility or the prioritization of other matters—but respectfully, after over four years of inaction on a Franks hearing, that explanation feels insufficient. We're not talking about a crowded docket stretching timelines by months—this is a constitutional challenge that's been on ice for years, despite clear and compelling Fourth Amendment concerns.

As for the idea that this isn’t “active obstruction,” I understand why it might seem unlikely. But consider this: we’ve seen sudden motions to withdraw right before scheduled hearings, prosecutorial silence on key filings like the motion to suppress (filed back in September 2024) and known third parties disseminating misinformation that has influenced both counsel and potentially the court. When that pattern emerges alongside missed deadlines, quashed warrants, and Brady violations—it’s no longer a theory. It’s a structure.

So yes, maybe it's not XXXXX or XXXXX pulling strings directly. But the deeper concern isn't necessarily about conspiracy—it's about systemic indifference that allows manipulation, misinformation, and misconduct to go unchecked.

If that’s not obstruction in effect, I don’t know what is


The issue of being "blown off" has already been resolved. In an email, she confirmed that most of the questions I had submitted were already part of her planned examination for the suppression hearing. Those questions were intended for witnesses as part of the motion to suppress, and there was no hostile exchange between us.

The claim of “irreconcilable differences” originated from an email that was actually sent to her—not by me, but by Dirty Harry. He even acknowledged on my website that he sent it. She confirmed to me personally that a series of messages from him were the catalyst for this situation.

Absolutely—it's true that the system often wears people down, and many take pleas not because they're guilty, but because they can't endure the grind. That’s a hard, unfortunate reality.

But what I’m describing isn’t just bureaucratic drag or prosecutorial indifference. It’s a documented pattern:

A warrant that was quashed.

A Franks hearing delayed for over four years.

Third-party interference with defense counsel and potential witnesses.

Suppression motions ignored.

Disclosures withheld in violation of Brady v. Maryland.

When you stack all of that together—not just the slowness, but the timing, the outside meddling, and the procedural irregularities—it's not just frustrating. It begins to look like targeted obstruction, or at minimum, a system being manipulated by people outside it for personal reasons.

So, while I understand the hesitation to label something a conspiracy, this isn’t a belief built on paranoia—it’s a conclusion drawn from patterns, documents, and missed constitutional obligations.

I’m not asking anyone to believe in smoke where there’s no fire. I’m just asking them to recognize there’s a building burning down and the sprinklers haven’t even turned on.

Thanks for the acknowledgment on the frustration—that part’s real. But I need to respond directly to this idea that my using my website or forum somehow invalidates my position or hands "ammunition" to anyone.

Let’s be clear: transparency isn’t the problem—misuse of that transparency by third parties is. I used my site and platform to document procedural delays, challenge legal irregularities, and speak openly about a process that had stalled for years. That’s not performative—it’s defensive. It’s also my First Amendment right.

Now, if people from Kiwi Farms or elsewhere twisted that information for harassment or character attacks, that’s on them—not on me for refusing to stay silent. Silence benefits institutions hoping you’ll break under pressure. I chose not to let that happen.

Could I have handled disclosure differently? Possibly. But when you're boxed out of court proceedings and legal remedies stall, sometimes putting the facts in the sunlight is the only leverage you’ve got.

So, if I'm being criticized for not going quietly? I'll wear that. But I won’t apologize for refusing to disappear.


That’s a fair question—and one that deserves a clear answer. What I believe is being "suppressed" isn’t just evidence; it’s accountability and due process.

We filed a motion to suppress back in September 2024. As of now—almost a year later—the State still hasn’t filed a response, let alone set a hearing date. That’s not just delay. That’s procedural neglect.

What’s being suppressed is:

The opportunity to examine the validity of a quashed warrant

The chance to challenge an overbroad digital search that gathered everything from 15 devices

The exposure of how CSAM allegations arose from evidence acquired after probable cause had already collapsed

The discussion around third-party interference that may have influenced legal counsel and shaped court perception

So yes, a formal evidentiary hearing hasn’t occurred—but suppression isn’t always about the moment in court. It’s about how long the road to that courtroom is conveniently stretched by one side while constitutional questions sit in limbo.

Delay is suppression—when it's used to outwait the truth.

Let me be clear—my frustration isn’t about the concept of being investigated. It’s about how that investigation was handled, what was omitted, and how key decisions were shaped by external influence and outdated assumptions.

There is evidence that third parties, specifically Dirty Tony, interfered with my defense. The public defender herself told me directly and in person that communications from him impacted her perception of the case. He even posted online that he sent those emails. That kind of external meddling—especially from someone openly antagonistic—is not harmless commentary. It’s interference.

As for “misrepresentations,” I’m referring to claims made to the court and defense that the materials cited in my motion to suppress originated from me or my family. That’s false. Every fact in that motion is sourced from official files—the city police, the state, and the FBI—including discovery the prosecution initially withheld in violation of Brady v. Maryland.

Now, regarding the origins of this case: yes, the initial accusation involved a school threat—and when it was confirmed I wasn’t the poster, that matter was dropped. The problem is, the State kept going anyway. The city police handed the computers over to the FBI because they (the city police) didn’t have the ability to investigate Internet crimes. They (the FBI) didn’t get a new warrant for two years. They searched anyway. The seizure of every file from 15 devices wasn’t specific or timely. It was a general warrant, if it can be called one at all.

The “Mdew” allegation emerged after the second warrant, supposedly prompted by an anime image. But even that timeline is murky—and the image in question was likely computer-generated, which is legal under both federal and Illinois law.

This isn’t about denying scrutiny. It’s about demanding that scrutiny be constitutional, fact-based, and free from personal bias or third-party manipulation. The Franks hearing isn’t about the image, it’s about the legality of the search warrant. Because if the warrants are invalid then the case falls apart.

That’s a fair point—and ironically, it circles right back to the very heart of what the Franks hearing is about: how law enforcement got inside those devices in the first place, why they were searching, and under what authority. The CSAM allegation is the end of the trail—not the beginning.

My focus has always been the legality of the process—not the media frenzy that trails behind it. This all began with a warrant tied to a school threat I provably had nothing to do with. When that narrative fell apart, what should have happened is exactly what the Constitution demands: stop the search, return the property, and correct the record.

Instead, we got silence, delays, a quashed warrant, and nearly two years before the FBI got a second one—based on what? An anime-style image that, by legal standards, doesn't even qualify as contraband. That jump—from vague suspicion to sweeping search—is where the rights violations stack up, and that’s why the timeline, the data trail, and the cross-agency handling all matter.

And no—I haven’t lost the plot. I’m just refusing to ignore the opening chapters because the ending is messy. Due process applies from page one. That’s what this hearing is about. That’s where my attention is.

The Charge is one count for one image that the state is claiming is child porn. Agent O'Sullivan who is the FBI forensic expert claimed it was computer-generated.

In Ashcroft v Free Speech Coalition (which I was somewhat part of) the US Supreme Court in 2002 ruled that computer-generated images were not only legal but constitutional protected speech. 

Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition | Oyez


In 2003 the Illinois Supreme Court ruled that virtual images including computer-generated images was legal and constitutional protected speech.

PEOPLE v. ALEXANDER (2003) | FindLaw

you can go here Todd Daugherty / N9OGL / Fox Smith / Doc Dot | Kiwi Farms you can't post all your stupid and gay shit there; they love that stuff.

1. What is a Franks Hearing?


A Franks hearing is a court proceeding that challenges the validity of a search warrant. The hearing is named after the case Franks v. Delaware, which established the legal standard for challenging search warrants. 


2. How does a Franks hearing work?

1. The defendant requests a Franks hearing by filing a Franks motion with the judge. 
   
   
2. The judge grants a hearing if the defendant makes a preliminary showing that the affidavit contains false statements. 
   
   
3. At the hearing, the defendant presents evidence to prove that the affidavit contains false statements or omissions. 
   
   
4. If the defendant is successful, the judge suppresses any evidence obtained from the search.