There is BIG difference between Nick Rekieta and my case. I believe Nick warrant and Affidavit was based on a known informant while mine wasn't, the informant in my case was anonymous and was uncorroborated by the FBI and the police without additional investigation. His search warrant was based on the search for items (drugs) in his home, Mine was based on the seizure of 15 computers without stating in the warrant or affidavit what the crime was, or what they were looking for. They do mention in my warrant " information pertaining to internet searches pertaining to posts regarding threats of violence directed towards schools or public officials" but as the motion to suppress states: "However, that clause is in and of itself both overbroad and insufficiently particular. The affidavit did not contain any information establishing threats to public officials or towards schools in general. Had they actually connected Daugherty to that post (which they did not) the only possible thing they could investigate him for was the March 16, 2018, threat "FUCK YOU YOU STALKING MOTHER FUCKERS. I'LL SHOW YOU WHO IS AUSTIC. I'LL GO TO FUCKING MEMORIAL ELEMENTARY SCHOOL AND MAKE SANDY HOOK LOOK LIKE A SUNDAY SCHOOL PICNIC" posted on hateandflame.com." They did NO investigation to link me to the threat, instead they arrested me and stole my stuff, based on a fucking LIE

 His (Nick) warrant was valid while mine is a general warrant. 

My Case

1. The information for the informant was uncorroborated and the police and the FBI DID NO INVESTIGATION into the case.
2. The warrant seized 15 computers without stating what they were looking for and allowed the seizure of "any and all data" without limiting what they can search for on those 15 devices.



perhaps you should read the motion to suppress and stop being a dumbass

suppression.pdf

New definition of child in illinois child porn law

Purported child" means a visual representation that appears to depict a child under the age of 18 but may or may not depict an actual child under the age of 18.

The answer is no.

“At the same time, the warrant authorized the wholesale seizure of all electronic devices discovered in the apartment, including items owned by third parties. In those circumstances, we conclude that the warrant was unsupported by probable cause and unduly broad in its reach.” United States v. Griffith, 867 F.3d 1265, 1270-71 (D.C. Cir. 2017)


“Although we pay "great deference" to the judge's initial determination of probable cause, a warrant application cannot rely merely on "conclusory statement[s]." Id. at 236, 239, 103 S.Ct. 2317 (citing Nathanson v. United States , 290 U.S. 41, 54 S.Ct. 11, 78 L.Ed. 159 (1933) ).” United States v. Griffith, 867 F.3d 1265, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 2017)


The Supreme Court has long distinguished between arrest warrants and search warrants. See Steagald v. United States , 451 U.S. 204, 212-13, 101 S.Ct. 1642, 68 L.Ed.2d 38 (1981). An arrest warrant rests on probable cause to believe that the suspect committed an offense; it thus primarily serves to protect an individual's liberty interest against an unreasonable seizure of his person. Id. at 213, 101 S.Ct. 1642. A search warrant, by contrast, is grounded in "probable cause to believe that the legitimate object of a search is located in a particular place." Id. Rather than protect an individual's person, a search warrant "safeguards an individual's interest in the privacy of his home and possessions against the unjustified intrusion of the police."
United States v. Griffith, 867 F.3d 1265, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 2017)


Regardless of whether an individual is validly suspected of committing a crime, an application for a search warrant concerning his property or possessions must demonstrate cause to believe that "evidence is likely to be found at the place to be searched." Groh v. Ramirez , 540 U.S. 551, 568, 124 S.Ct. 1284, 157 L.Ed.2d 1068 (2004). Moreover, "[t]here must, of course, be a nexus ... between the item to be seized and criminal behavior." Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden , 387 U.S. 294, 307, 87 S.Ct. 1642, 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967).
United States v. Griffith, 867 F.3d 1265, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 2017)


The Fourth Amendment requires that warrants "particularly describe" the "things to be seized." U.S. Const. amend. IV. That condition "ensures that the search will be carefully tailored to its justifications, and will not take on the character of the wide-ranging exploratory searches the Framers intended to prohibit." Garrison , 480 U.S. at 84, 107 S.Ct. 1013. Consequently, a warrant with an "indiscriminate sweep" is "constitutionally intolerable." Stanford v. Texas , 379 U.S. 476, 486, 85 S.Ct. 506, 13 L.Ed.2d 431 (1965). We will hold a warrant invalid when "overly broad." United States v. Maxwell , 920 F.2d 1028, 1033-34 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
United States v. Griffith, 867 F.3d 1265, 1275 (D.C. Cir. 2017)


The warrant's overbreadth is particularly notable because police sought to seize otherwise lawful objects: electronic devices. Courts have allowed more latitude in connection with searches for contraband items like "weapons [or] narcotics." Stanford , 379 U.S. at 486, 85 S.Ct. 506 (internal quotation marks omitted). But the understanding is different when police seize "innocuous" objects. See Andresen v. Maryland , 427 U.S. 463, 482 n.11, 96 S.Ct. 2737, 49 L.Ed.2d 627 (1976). Those circumstances call for special "care to assure [the search is] conducted in a manner that minimizes unwarranted intrusions upon privacy." Id. ; see also 2 LaFave, Search & Seizure § 4.6(d).
United States v. Griffith, 867 F.3d 1265, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 2017)

1. 1996 Congress passed the Child Pornography Prevention Act (CPPA)

2. In 2002 the US Supreme Court struck the law down because it made materials using "virtual children" illegal (Ashcroft v Free Speech Coalition 2002)

3. In 2003 Congress passed the PROTECT ACT replaced the CPPA removing the issues in CPPA. 

4. In 2008 a part of the PROTECT ACT was struck down because it only contained one of three prongs of the miller test (for obscenity) when the US Supreme court has stated in the past all three prongs are required to deem something obscene. (United States v Handley) 

5. Also, in 2008 The US Supreme court ruled that the pandering (offering or requesting to transfer, sell, deliver, or trade the items) section of PROTECT ACT was constitutional. Like obscenity, pandering child porn and virtual child porn is illegal to buy or sell through interstate commerce. The Court further stated that 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(3)(B) would not be construed to punish the solicitation or offering of "virtual" (computer generated/animated) child pornography, thus comporting with the holding of Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002). In keeping with Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002),[6] The Court stated that "an offer to provide or request to receive virtual child pornography is not prohibited by the statute. A crime is committed only when the speaker believes or intends the listener to believe that the subject of the proposed transaction depicts real children. It is simply not true that this means 'a protected category of expression [will] inevitably be suppressed,' post, at 13. Simulated child pornography will be as available as ever." (United States v Williams 2008 US Supreme Court)

Illinois Child Pornography Law is Unconstitutional and here is why. In 2003 the Illinois Supreme court heard the case of People v Alexander. 


1. Background

On February 27, 2002, the defendant was indicted in the circuit court of Lake County on 45 counts of child pornography under section 11-20.1(a)(1)(ii) and 9 counts of child pornography under section 11-20.1(a)(6) of the Criminal Code of 1961. See 720 ILCS 5/11-20.1(a)(1)(ii), (a)(6) (West Supp. 2001). The indictment charged that the defendant possessed and intended to distribute computer depictions of children that he knew or reasonably should have known to be under 18 years of age engaged in various sexual activities.

The defendant entered a guilty plea to the first five counts in exchange for a seven-year sentence but later withdrew his plea after the United States Supreme Court decided Ashcroft. He then filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, asserting that sections 11-20.1(a)(1) and 11-20.1(a)(6) facially violated the federal and state constitutions. The defendant argued that the "depict by computer" language in section 11-20.1(a)(1) and the "depiction by computer" language in section 11-20.1(a)(6) prohibit virtual child pornography protected by Ashcroft. According to the defendant, "These Illinois statutes extend Illinois' prohibition against child pornography to sexually explicit images that appear to depict minors but were produced by computer without using any real children."

On May 15, 2002, the trial court granted the defendant's motion, finding sections 11-20.1(a)(1) and 11-20.1(a)(6) unconstitutional. The court stated:

"Inasfar as the Illinois statute is concerned, the statute was, of course, created before the pronouncements of the Supreme Court in the Ashcroft case. I find the Illinois statute to be *** as overbroad as the federal statute because it allows for someone possessing a computer-generated image to be convicted as if he were to have possessed a real child's picture, and that's something that the Constitution does not allow. That's something that the U.S. Supreme Court does not allow.

I read the Illinois statute to be similar to the federal statute, where a computer-generated picture might show someone that appears as a minor or conveys the impression that the material is a minor. *** Because the Illinois statute allows someone to be prosecuted and convicted because he possesses a depiction by computer of any child and does not make the distinction of real child or live child or an identifiable child; thus, the Illinois statute constitutionally fails gravely.

Therefore, insofar as this indictment pertains to those two sections of the statute that involve virtual children, that involve computer-generated images or children depicted by computer, this motion to dismiss will be granted." (Emphases added.)

 The State appealed it to Illinois Supreme Court which ruled that section 11-20.1(f)(7) of the Illinois Child Pornography law was unconstitutional. Section 11-20.1(f)(7) states:

 "For the purposes of this Section, "child pornography" includes a film, videotape, photograph, or other similar visual medium or reproduction or depiction by computer that is, or appears to be, that of a person, either in part, or in total, under the age of 18 or a person with a severe or profound intellectual disability, regardless of the method by which the film, videotape, photograph, or other similar visual medium or reproduction or depiction by computer is created, adopted, or modified to appear as such. "Child pornography" also includes a film, videotape, photograph, or other similar visual medium or reproduction or depiction by computer that is advertised, promoted, presented, described, or distributed in such a manner that conveys the impression that the film, videotape, photograph, or other similar visual medium or reproduction or depiction by computer is of a person under the age of 18 or a person with a severe or profound intellectual disability."

That section of the law was "severed" from the rest of the law; however, it seems it has not been severed as the state wishes to believe. State Attorney throughout Illinois is still going after material that is not a real child but is "virtual" and as the state Supreme Court and US Supreme Court has not only said it is legal but is constitutional protected speech. So apparently that section is still be used and also believe other sections of the Illinois Child porn law is also being read to allow the arrest of individuals for virtual child pornography. 

The law IS unconstitutional because it's not only going after speech that is illegal (real child porn) but it's going after virtual child porn (which is legal and constitutionally protected speech) under the gist of it all being child porn and illegal, which the US Supreme Court has said it is not. 

Illinois Child Porn law

720 ILCS 5/11-20.1

Ashcroft v Free Speech Coalition (2002)

 Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition | Oyez

People v State of Illinois v Alexander

People v. Alexander :: 2003 :: Supreme Court of Illinois Decisions :: Illinois Case Law :: Illinois Law :: US Law :: Justia



I WILL NOT ONLY FIGHT OVER THAT GENERAL WARRANT BULLSHIT, BUT I WILL DESTROY THE ILLINOIS CHILD PORNOGRAPHY LAW!!!

BTW State of Illinois for full discloser I belong to groups that filed amicus curiae supporting the Free Speech coalition in Ashcroft.

“The major, overriding problem with the description of the object of the search—“any or all files”—is that the police did not have probable cause to believe that everything on the phone was evidence of the crime of public indecency.” United States v. Winn, 79 F. Supp. 3d 904, 919 (S.D. Ill. 2015)

Remember, the internet (nor I) doesn't care about your rights, it only cares that you downloaded child pornography and this never ever goes away.

P.S. - and those teens who reported you to the authorities in 2018 deserve a medal. I still have a copy of the video.

1. they didn't have probable cause
2. The warrant was a general warrant
3. material was omitted on the affidavit and warrant, which if seen by the judge the judge wouldn't have granted the warrant
4. the general warrant was quashed so the search was a warrantless search.
5. the FBI agent omitted material from the federal warrant which if seen by the judge the judge wouldn't have granted the warrant

So how am I going to jail again??